1. The main aim of this note is to show that mixed strategies may be eliminated from statistical decision rules based on the observation of random variables with continuous distribution functions, and from games of a similar structure.
After stating a general measure-theoretic result in 2. we deduce in 3. and 4. some results on games. In 5. and 6. we give some results on decision problems. Our methods lead to considerably more general results than those presented here (in particular they can be applied to what may be termed sequential games). The selection of results presented here was motivated by our interest in statistical problems. Proofs and a more complete study of the subject will be published elsewhere.
2. Let {x} = X be any space and {SI = 3 a Borel field of subsets of X.
Let Mk(S) (k = 1, 2, ..., p) be a finite number of real-valued, bounded and countably additive set functions defined for all S e S. The fundamental measure theoretic result mentioned in the introduction is the following: THEOREM 1. Let flj(x) (j = 1, 2, .. ., n) be real non-negative 3-measurable functions satisfying T7h(x) = 1 for allxeX.
(1) j = 1 Then, if the set functions ,k(S) (k = 1, 2, ..., p) are non-atomic,' there exists a decomposition of X into n disjoint subsets S1, ..., 5n belonging to 3 which have the property that ]' ?,j(x)d1k(X) = ik(SJ) (j = 1, 2, ..., n; k = 1, 2, ..., p). (2) The proof of this theorem makes use of a result of A. Liapounoff2 on the ranges of vector measures and yields, incidentally, an extension of his result. The non-atomicity requirement is indispensable. It is this assumption that is responsible for the possibility to disregard mixed strategies in the games treated here, as opposed to the finite games originally considered by J. von Neumann.3 3. Consider now a two-person zero-sum game where player I has a finite number of pure strategies i (i = 1, 2, . . ., m) while the pure strategies of player II consist of 3-measurable functions l(x) defined over X and assuming only the values 1, 2, .. ., n. The outcome of the game when the above pure strategies are adopted is given by n K(i, 1(x)) = E #L(Si
where Sj is the set where l(x) assumes the value j and the ,.j(S) (i = 1, . m. . m; j = 1, ..., n) are real-valued, bounded, countably additive set functions defined for S e 8.
The general, mixed or pure, strategies of I may be represented by vectors t = (1, *.. * * m) of non-negative components adding up to one, while the general strategy of II may be written as a vector function q(x) = (vi(x), * . t, ) f(x)) the components of which are non-negative S-measurable functions satisfying (1). When these strategies are adopted the outcome of the game is
A pure strategy of II may be also represented by a vector 77(x), only now the additional assumption is made that all components are either zero or one for all x. We easily deduce from Theorem 1 the following: THEOREM 2. If the set functions ,u(S) (i = 1, ..., m; j = 1, .. ., n) are non-atomic, then to every strategy 71(x) of player II there exists a pure strategy 1r*(x) equivalent to it, i.e., such that K(Q, r (x)) = K(Q, r/*(x)) for all strategies t of player I.
In most cases the functions ,u(S) are given by ;4ij(S) = fSaij(x)d,u(x), where the ,t(S) (i = 1, ..., m) have the properties described above and the a j(x) (j = 1, ..., n) are 8-measurable real-valued functions integrable with respect to ,.A(S). The special case when the functions aij(x) reduce to constants is particularly important. For this case we have THEOREM 3. If in the preceding theorem i,u(S) = aijA,(S) then whatever 7(x) there exists a pure strategy 71*(x) equivalent to it simultaneously for all choices of the constants ajj. 4 . We now return to Theorem 1, but instead of considering the case where there existed a finite number of functions Ak(S) we consider the case when k varies in some abstract space K. Let us introduce a metric g into the space K by putting g(k, k') = sup k(S) -Ak'(S) 1, the sup being taken with respect to S e S. It is clear that if all other conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied and the space M, with the metric g, is conditionally compact then, given e > 0, one may find a decomposition of X into disjoint Sj e 8 such that I fx7ij(x)dAk(x) -Atk(Sj) I < e (j = 1, . . ., n; k c-K). We now consider games of the kind described in 3. except that we drop the restriction that i vary over a finite set and allow it to vary over an arbitrary space I. The outcome when pure strategies are adopted is again given by (3), while generally it is given by K(Q, q(x)) = fI{E fxj(x)dAU(x) tt, = .t being a probability distribution over I representing the first player's strategy.
From the preceding application of Fj(x) is the true distribution function is U r(0)= E f1wj(x)?j,(x)dFj(x).
We again say that the decision function 11(x) is non-randomized if for every x all but one of the ii(x) vanish.
There is no difficulty in deducing from Theorem 1 the following result. THEOREM 5. If the distribution functions are non-atomic then given any decision function q(x), there exists a non-randomized decision function n*(x) equivalent to it, i.e., such that ri(fl*) = rj(17) for i = 1, 2, ..., m. If, more-over, the loss functions Wij(X) reduce to constants we,, there exists a nonrandomized n*(x) equivalent to qi(x) simultaneously for all choices of the constants wij. 6 . In a sequential procedure the sample size is not given in advance. In this case the problem may be presented as follows: An infinite sequence of real chance variables (xl, x2, . . ., xt, ... ) is distributed according to an unknown one of a finite number of distribution functions F&(x, x2, .... xi, ... ) (i = 1, 2, .. ., m). The statistician has again a choice of a finite number n of (terminal) decisions. His decision rule 5 consists of real, non-negative, measurable functions (x x2, ..., x) (v = 0, 1, ..., n; t = 1, 2, . . . ) satisfying E t(xl, X2, ...,Xt) = 1 for all-o < xi, ...,x < c. p= 0
The decision rule expressed by 5 is interpreted thus: According to the observed value7 xl, the statistician decides either to continue experimentation and make another observation, or to stop further experimentation and adopt a terminal decision j(j = 1, . . ., n) with the respective probabilities Bo,(xi) or jl (xl) (j = 1, . .., n). If it is decided to continue experimentation, a value of x2 is observed and it is again decided either to make a further observation or adopt a terminal decision j with respective probabilities 502(xi, x2) and Bj2(x1, x2) 
